Salaries.. a Houthi pretext to rob oil and gas revenues in the liberated areas
تاريخ النشر: 24th, August 2023 GMT
The recent visit of the Omani delegation to Sana'a to meet with the leadership of the Houthi group, Iran's arm in Yemen, has shed light on the failure of regional and international efforts 10 months ago to reach a comprehensive agreement to renew the UN armistice and initiate political negotiations to end the conflict in Yemen.
This failure is due to the set of obstacles placed by the Houthi group in the face of these efforts, and its insistence on imposing its demands in this agreement and wrapping it with the banner of "humanitarian demands", represented in lifting all restrictions on Sana'a airport and the port of Hodeidah and paying the salaries of employees in the areas under its control according to the 2014 budget and statements.
The last item is the main point of disagreement between the group on the one hand and the alliance and legitimacy on the other hand and the point of view of each party on the file, in addition to the size of the complexities related to the file and its connection to other thorny files awaiting the two parties in the negotiations for a political settlement.
The dispute starts from the point of determining who is included in the process of paying salaries in the areas controlled by the Houthi group, where the legitimate government insists that the matter be limited to civil servants only according to the 2014 lists, while obligating the Houthi group to harness the revenues of the port of Hodeidah for that according to what is stipulated in the Stockholm Agreement signed in late 2018.
What the government puts forward is rejected by the Houthi group and presents a completely different vision, as it demands the payment of salaries in the areas under its control from the revenues of exporting oil and gas produced in the liberated governorates, according to the figures of the 2014 budget and not the employee statements for the year 2014, while refusing to talk about the revenues of the port of Hodeidah and the rest of the revenues it collects in the areas of its control.
Recently, there has been talk about the existence of an initial agreement in the efforts led by Oman between Al-Houthi and Saudi Arabia as a compromise between the two points of view based on the disbursement of salaries from oil and gas export revenues, as proposed by Al-Houthi, but according to the 2014 lists as proposed by the government, with the dispute remaining over determining the payment of civil servants as proposed. The government proposes or includes the military and security forces, as Houthi demands.
Despite the positive news about resolving the most important obstacles to the agreement, the complications related to the implementation mechanism and agreement on it seem more difficult due to the reality that has been created since the war 8 years ago and the difference between the figures of 2014 and today's numbers, in addition to the financial and banking division imposed by the Houthi group.
According to the 2014 budget presented by the Government of National Accord at the time to Parliament, oil and gas revenues were estimated at 938 billion riyals, while the salaries item was estimated at 977 billion riyals, distributed between 435 billion riyals for the army, security and intelligence, and 542 billion riyals for civil sector salaries.
In view of the oil and gas revenues estimated at 938 billion riyals, it is clear from the details of the budget that half of this amount, 472 billion, is due to the revenues from sales of oil that is refined locally in Aden refineries, which has stopped since 2016.
In addition to 136 billion riyals expected revenues for the government from exporting gas in the Balhaf project, which has also stopped, and about 35 billion riyals expected revenues from selling gas locally and produced from Safer in Marib.
While the estimate of crude oil export revenues for the year 2014 does not exceed 313 billion riyals only (about $1.4 billion), a figure that does not cover the salaries of civil servants according to the same budget, which is estimated at 542 billion riyals.
Despite this, oil export revenues in the 2014 budget, according to the exchange rate at the time, are not much different from 2022 , which is estimated according to Central Bank data and government statements at about $1.5 billion. However, the difference lies in the value of the local currency between this period.
Here, the most important dilemma arises in the matter of paying salaries, which is the financial and banking division imposed by the Houthi group, which created a difference between the value of the local currency in the areas under its control and the liberated areas.
Agreeing to pay salaries from oil and gas export revenues, which are of course in hard currency, necessitates unifying the value of the local currency to unify the process of disbursing salaries, and necessitates with it unifying the body that collects oil sales and disbursing them as salaries to employees.
Facts that the Houthi group realizes the difficulty of overcoming and its connection to the agreement on the issues of the final solution, which explains its insistence on its point of view in the salary file that the oil export revenues be divided with the legitimate government according to the population density and that it obtains 70-80% of these revenues, which represents the real goal for the group to rob it after it was unable to do so militarily, and the salary peg raises a cover to achieve this goal.
المصدر: نيوزيمن
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Al-Shalfi: Houthi Escalation Is a Negotiating Tactic, Not a Move Toward War
Journalist Ahmed Al-Shalfi has affirmed that the latest Houthi escalation against Saudi Arabia is more indicative of a negotiating pressure tool than genuine preparation for an all-out war. His comments come amid what he described as “confirmed” reports of ongoing talks between Houthi representatives and Saudi officials aimed at reaching a comprehensive political solution to the Yemeni crisis.
Speaking to Arabi21, Al-Shalfi said the “recent threats issued by the Houthi group against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are notable both in timing and intensity and were far from spontaneous. They were made across all levels of the group — from its leader to political and media officials, down to field commanders — reflecting a coordinated and deliberate decision to raise the ceiling of rhetoric toward Riyadh.”
He noted that this escalation became more apparent following a statement issued Saturday by the Houthi-run Ministry of Interior announcing the discovery of an alleged “intelligence cell run by the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia,” which the group claimed was operating from within Saudi territory.
According to Al-Shalfi, the statement clearly suggests that the level of dialogue between the Houthis and the Kingdom “may have stalled,” pushing the group from subtle messaging to direct accusations — a shift that indicates “unprecedented tension” in the ongoing communication channels between the two sides.
He added that Houthi-affiliated media have recently resumed publishing reports of artillery shelling targeting border areas in Saada governorate, describing these incidents as “Saudi aggression.” He pointed out that such rhetoric had largely disappeared over the past two years, and its return in this manner signals “a real crisis in the trajectory of understandings with Riyadh, as well as an attempt to revive the narrative of external threat to mobilize internal support and redirect public opinion.”
Al-Shalfi continued: “What is striking is that all of this coincides with confirmed reports of talks between Houthi representatives and Saudi Arabia that appear to have made no tangible progress — particularly as the Houthis insist on returning to the roadmap agreed upon by Yemeni parties and Saudi Arabia before the Gaza war. That roadmap is no longer acceptable to the United States or influential regional actors, as it granted the Houthis broad political and economic concessions.”
He explained: “From this perspective, the Houthi escalation — including the intelligence cell statement and the limited border-level tensions — is better understood as a negotiating pressure tactic rather than preparation for a full-scale war.” He noted that the group, by nature, is “adventurous and non-hesitant,” and may undertake field actions to demonstrate seriousness, improve its negotiating position, or secure gains.
However, he stressed that “today’s reality is entirely different from what it was two years ago. The Houthis are now in a phase of hesitation after suffering losses from American and Israeli strikes and the killing of several of their political and military leaders, in addition to the weakening of Iran’s regional axis following the Gaza war.”
Al-Shalfi concluded that the Houthi escalation “is likely to remain confined to rhetoric, accusations, and limited clashes without developing into a broader confrontation,” noting that the group “understands that any full-scale war at this moment could open a front it is not prepared to withstand.”
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