The wave of anger against former Foreign Minister Khaled al-Yamani's description of the September 26 revolution as a coup shed light on the way in which the legitimacy managed the confrontation with the Houthi group during the eight years of war.

 Al-Yamani described in an article published in "The Independent Arabia" the revolution of September 26, 1962, which ended the backward Imamate rule, as "a coup carried out by a group of officers," and that this coup - as he claimed - "opened the gates of hell for the Yemenis," which sparked anger.

 It was widely criticized by Yemeni activists on social media.

In an attempt to mitigate this, Al-Yamani said in a statement reported by journalist Faris Al-Hamiri that September 26 turned into a revolution when the people of the southern regions, the people of the central regions, and the people of Taiz came and defended it.  In the beginning, it was a coup by a group of officers who copied the experience of the Free Officers in Egypt, and this is an unambiguous historical fact.

 Al-Yamani attacked the criticism leveled at him and reminded him of his role in signing the Stockholm Agreement that halted the battle to liberate Hodeidah in late 2018 in his capacity as head of the government delegation, and considered that as a shameful story every day that is raised, stressing that President (Hadi) is behind this issue, the coalition and the international pressure exerted on us. As he said.

These justifications were blown up by the former government minister, Abdul Raqib Saif Fatah, in a tweet to him on the "X" platform, in which he strongly attacked Al-Yamani, describing him as an "opportunist" and his attempt to clear himself of the "Stockholm crime," revealing that former Prime Minister Ben Dagher had formed a committee to develop an integrated vision about what  It is supposed to happen around Hodeidah.

  Fatah added, "I and Al-Yamani were members of it, in addition to two ministers. We prepared an integrated vision for Hodeidah, from which Al-Yamani left and went alone to sign that disaster."

Al-Yamani's statements represented an opportunity to re-talk about the absurd performance with which the leadership of the legitimacy managed the battle with the Houthi group since 2015, and how this allowed the arrival of opportunistic personalities without an absolute position and loyalty to the comprehensive battle waged by the Yemenis against the Houthi group and the Imami thought in general, which led it to defeat and failure.

Writer Abd al-Salam al-Qaisi expresses his shock at al-Yamani's speech, saying: We fought for years with a foreign minister who finally said: September 26 is a coup, like hell!  While the activist Magda Al-Haddad commented on the matter by saying: After what Khaled Al-Yamani said about the September 26 revolution that it was a coup, I am not surprised by the defeat of legitimacy in front of Al-Houthi as long as this was a foreign minister!!

 As for the writer Hamdan Al-Ali, he says in one of his publications, commenting on what Al-Yamani said: Today I realized that the existence of these models at the top of the pyramid of power is the main reason for our losses during the past decade.  Any official who does not believe in the republican system, does not care about the cause, and considers himself a mere employee, you will find him working for the Houthis in one way or another.

Journalist Hisham al-Ziyadi saw al-Yamani's statements as "revealing what is hidden about the issue of appointments within the legitimacy and that they are mere concessions and grants, and are not based on integrated action within a clear strategy to confront the coup, restore the state, and preserve the country," he said.

المصدر: نيوزيمن

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Riyadh Brings Together Yemen’s Legitimacy Factions: Impending Battle or Messages of Peace and Position Sorting?

In a notable development following a series of mixed political and military signals, the Saudi capital, Riyadh, hosted a meeting that brought together the presidency of Yemen’s Consultation and Reconciliation Commission, and the leaders of political factions and parties affiliated with it, along with the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al Jaber.

 

 

“As part of the Kingdom’s continued support for comprehensive peace efforts, national reconciliation, and the stabilization of Yemen, I met today with the leadership of the Yemeni Consultation and Reconciliation Commission, as well as the heads of political factions and parties in the commission. I stressed the importance of supporting all efforts toward security, peace, stability, and development in Yemen.”

 

Yemeni political figure and Commission member Abdelmalik Al-Mekhlafi echoed this sentiment, tweeting:

 

“Today’s meeting in Riyadh between the leadership of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission and political party leaders with Ambassador Mohammed bin Saeed Al Jaber once again demonstrates the Kingdom’s and its leadership’s commitment to achieving reconciliation in Yemen, along with peace, stability, and development. It also reflects the strategic brotherly partnership between the Kingdom and Yemen toward achieving these noble goals.”

 

 

These statements come at a charged regional moment, with reports circulating of possible preparations for a ground operation in Yemen, while indirect talks continue between Tehran and Washington. Notably, the recent visit by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman to Tehran, during which he met with Iran’s Supreme Leader, was anything but routine.

 

Within this broader regional and international context, Saudi Arabia has made two significant diplomatic moves related to the Yemen file. The first occurred in Washington, D.C., this past February, where Prince Khalid met with his American counterpart and other senior U.S. officials. That meeting reportedly focused on security coordination and regional issues, including Yemen and the Houthis. The second, more recent meeting took place in Tehran in April.

 

It is worth noting that Ambassador Al Jaber was present at both meetings—an indication that the Yemen issue featured prominently in discussions, both in Washington and Tehran.

 

These developments raise important questions: Is the Kingdom working to unify the political positions of Yemeni factions ahead of a potential escalation? Or is it seeking to reaffirm its role as a peace sponsor before the Houthis and the international community, especially amid speculation about a ground operation—one which Riyadh has officially denied any involvement in?

 

A critical point to observe here is the duality of messaging emerging from Riyadh. While official diplomatic rhetoric, as reflected in the ambassador’s meetings and statements, emphasizes de-escalation and support for peace efforts, Saudi media continues to broadcast messages about imminent military resolution and preparations for a decisive battle.

 

This contrast may be the result of a deliberate distribution of roles or it might signal hesitation regarding the final course of action. Regardless, it keeps the overall situation shrouded in ambiguity—an ambiguity that warrants careful analysis.

 

Given these dynamics, the question remains: Are we witnessing the dawn of a new Saudi-backed peace phase in Yemen? Or is this a last attempt to clarify positions before the eruption of a new round of conflict?


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  • Riyadh Brings Together Yemen’s Legitimacy Factions: Impending Battle or Messages of Peace and Position Sorting?