Analysis: Saudi Initiative to Form Salafi Forces in Yemen’s Al-Mahra Sparks Concerns in Oman
تاريخ النشر: 13th, December 2024 GMT
New details have surfaced regarding Saudi Arabia's plans to establish armed military units in Yemen's Al-Mahra Governorate, an eastern region bordering Oman.
According to information obtained by Al-Mawqe Post from local leaders in Al-Mahra, preparations are underway to train and set up camps for members of the hardline Salafi faction, a group supported and funded by Saudi Arabia to align with its regional agenda in Al-Mahra.
The Salafi faction was not originally present in Al-Mahra. They arrived after the events in Saada Governorate in 2013, which forced the Salafis to disperse across several Yemeni governorates after being driven out of Saada, a governorate that had once been their stronghold. This was due to the Dar al-Hadith center, founded by the spiritual leader of the Salafi movement in Yemen, Muqbil Hadi al-Wadi'i, who adopted the Salafi ideology in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.
The upheaval in Yemen after the February 2011 revolution and subsequent developments significantly affected the Salafis. Starting in 2012, the Houthis launched a brutal campaign in Saada, culminating in the Salafis’ forced displacement in early 2014 under the passive watch of the Yemeni government, which did nothing to intervene. In fact, the government's indifferent policies played a significant role in encouraging the Houthis to pursue their campaign, effectively abandoning the Salafis to their fate.
This incident was one of the key reasons behind the Salafis' migration to various Yemeni governorates in search of a safe haven. With the fall of the capital, Sana'a, to the Houthis in September 2014, the Salafis sought refuge in more distant provinces, hoping to find safety. Al-Mahra was one of the governorates they eventually reached.
The first Salafis arrived in Al-Mahra in 2014, during the height of the conflict in Saada and shortly before the capital's fall. As the war intensified, targeting the Dar al-Hadith center, a group of students and Salafi members from various governorates settled in Al-Mahra and attempted to establish a Salafi center in the district of Huswain District. However, the local residents opposed this move, expelling them and preventing the establishment of the center.
In Al-Mahra, the Salafis found a peaceful environment to remain, as the region had not previously witnessed sectarian strife. This allowed them to spread across several districts. However, their growing numbers and efforts to promote their ideology prompted a social movement against them. Demonstrations and protests erupted, calling for their expulsion and an end to their influence, particularly in the historic town of Qishn, where residents held protests in January 2018, demanding the removal of the Salafis. Even women participated in these protests.
The Salafi expansion in Al-Mahra coincided with Saudi Arabia's entry into the governorate at the end of 2017. The kingdom has since used the Salafis to further its agenda, providing them with housing, financial support, and local radio stations and mosques to propagate their beliefs and recruit students, both from within Al-Mahra and beyond.
This Saudi-backed empowerment of the Salafi faction has turned them into a significant challenge for the local community in Al-Mahra, particularly after some of their leaders issued fatwas declaring local figures to be infidels, while promoting Saudi policies, including Riyadh's stance on the recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza. This prompted local figures to denounce the actions and raise the issue with the government, which eventually reached an agreement with the Salafis to refrain from using mosques for sectarian incitement.
However, this calm was short-lived. Reports have surfaced of a Saudi plan to form military units from Salafi elements. Al-Mawqe Post obtained messages from a senior Salafi leader overseeing the preparations, discussing the need for land in Al-Mahra to establish a camp and prepare for the upcoming recruitment drive.
According to information obtained by "Al-Mawqe Post" from local sources in Al-Mahra, these forces will be named the "Homeland Shield Forces in Al-Mahra." They are an extension of newly formed local forces affiliated with the Presidential Leadership Council, headed by Rashad al-Alimi. These forces are primarily led by figures associated with the Salafi movement and are deployed across several provinces, including Hadramout, Shabwa, and Aden.
One member of these new formations confirmed that training for the new force would take place in Al-Mahra, with discussions currently underway to select a suitable location for their deployment and retraining. Recruits will be drawn from all eight districts of Al-Mahra.
Local media reports suggest that Saudi officers at Al-Ghaydah airport have secretly coordinated with Salafi leaders to form the new force. The Salafis justify this as the formation of a local force made up of native Mahra residents, unlike the existing government forces, which are spread across various Yemeni cities.
Saudi Arabia has previously established camps and security checkpoints in different parts of Al-Mahra since its arrival in the region, sparking protests from local residents. Under public pressure, the kingdom was forced to gradually withdraw from the areas where it had set up camps, although it has maintained a presence at Al-Ghaydah airport
.
The UAE, which entered Al-Mahra before Saudi Arabia, had also previously offered to fund and establish a military force, but the Mahra people rejected the proposal, halting both Saudi and Emirati ambitions.
The Yemeni Ministry of Defense, based in Aden, declined to comment to "Al-Mawqe Post" regarding this development. The Yemeni government similarly refused to provide any official statement, with one government official citing the sensitivity of the issue. However, information obtained by the publication indicates that there are indeed presidential directives for the recruitment of these forces. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, which wields significant influence over the Presidential Leadership Council, is reportedly pressuring for the formation of these units.
Residents of Al-Mahra governorate have expressed strong opposition to this initiative, viewing it as a potential catalyst for sectarianism and religious conflict within the community. In contrast, its proponents argue that it provides an opportunity to create a specialized force composed of local residents. Historically, prior to its integration into Yemen, Al-Mahra was an independent emirate allied with Britain, ruled by the Al-Afrar family. The emirate had its own army until it fell in 1967, when anti-colonial revolutionaries ousted the British and incorporated it into the newly formed People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
Among the prominent local voices denouncing the planned recruitment is Al-Mahra’s Deputy Governor for Youth Affairs, Badr Kalshat, who warned that such efforts could drag Al-Mahra into conflicts and entangle it in sectarian and religiously extreme military formations.
The opposition voices in Al-Mahra condemning these efforts by factions opposed to the presence of the Salafi movement have been notably subdued this time. This is particularly evident in the case of the Peaceful Sit-in Committee, which had led protests against Saudi presence in the province for several years. So far, no significant field activity or official statements have emerged from the committee regarding this issue.
Muslim Rafeet, head of security for the Mahra Sit-in Committee, said the committee strongly opposes the Salafi recruitment process and any operations conducted outside official state institutions. He accused the Salafi forces of serving foreign interests, undermining local security, and promoting extremist ideologies in comments to Al-Mahra TV.
Meanwhile, Emirati media has capitalized on reports of Saudi involvement in the impending recruitment, seeking to stir tension between Riyadh and local figures. The UAE-backed Al-Aarab newspaper, published in London, suggested that warnings about the recruitment were merely an attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood—an allusion to Yemen's Al-Islah party—to undermine Saudi Arabia.
This contradicts the reality in Al-Mahra, as the Al-Islah Party is one of the most prominent local forces supporting Saudi policy, particularly in Al-Mahra, and more generally in Yemen. The party's stance aligns significantly with the Salafi movement, making the handling of this issue a subject of media disputes and political finger-pointing.
The complexities surrounding the recruitment process appear highly sensitive, given that it is taking place in a border province with Oman. The Sultanate shares long-standing positive relations with the people of Al-Mahra, along with land and sea borders with Yemen. Oman holds a special status in the region, with deep-rooted familial and tribal ties between the two countries. The export of the Salafi movement to Oman's borders could provoke significant concern in Muscat, potentially reigniting tensions in the province and exposing underlying conflicts.
المصدر: الموقع بوست
كلمات دلالية: Saudi Arabia
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Analysis: Yemen Reacts to Assad’s Fall – Government Optimistic, Houthis Silent
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has drawn mixed reactions across Yemen, a nation whose own conflict bears striking similarities to the Syrian scenario. Both nations share key features, including their experience during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 and the profound influence of external actors.
Yemen and Syria are both part of the Arab Spring. In Yemen, the uprising led to the ousting of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (1978–2012) after prolonged protests, only for him to later align with the Houthi movement. In contrast, Bashar al-Assad managed to retain power in Syria, plunging the country into a bloody and complex civil war.
Yemen's transitional period, marked by the 2013 National Dialogue Conference initiated under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) framework, was once considered a potential model for Syria. However, the conspiracy against the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, and Yemen's descent into conflict, spearheaded by the Houthi alliance with Saleh, made the implementation of such a model in Syria unfeasible.
The parallels between the two countries, their uprisings, regimes, and subsequent consequences are striking, though with some key distinctions. Most notably, Bashar al-Assad's regime was far more brutal compared to Yemen’s Saleh. Both nations, however, share a significant connection to a common external force: Iran, which has identified them as part of four nations under its influence, asserting control through direct intervention or by utilizing local proxies.
External involvement has played a powerful role in both Yemen and Syria. In Yemen, fragmentation has given rise to diverse allegiances: one faction aligns with Iran, represented by the Houthi movement, while the Yemeni government is backed by a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A similar dynamic exists in Syria, where Iran plays a central role, while armed opposition groups receive significant external support.
Government and Political Responses
The Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, led by Rashad Al-Alimi and comprising eight members, was quick to issue a statement on the fall of Assad. The council congratulated the Syrian opposition, praised Syria's return to the Arab fold, and reaffirmed Yemen’s commitment to Syria’s territorial integrity and independence. However, the statement also underscored concerns over Iranian influence, labeling Syria as under Iranian tutelage.
Pro-government political parties in Yemen echoed similar sentiments. The National Bloc for Political Parties, a recently formed coalition based in Aden, celebrated the developments in Syria as an opportunity for stability and a rejection of Iranian dominance. This perspective aligns with Saudi Arabia's supportive stance toward these parties, despite the recent thaw in Saudi-Iranian relations.
In their statement, the parties characterized Assad's fall as an opportunity to confront the Houthi movement and bring an end to its coup in Yemen. While this aspiration is evident in their rhetoric, it remains confined to political declarations. The complexities of Yemen's conflict, coupled with the multitude of local and international actors involved, continue to hinder any tangible progress toward a breakthrough.
Public and Factional Responses
Various factions were quick to express their views on the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime. The Supreme Council of Popular Resistance, led by Sheikh Hamoud Al-Mekhlafi—one of the first figures to lead armed resistance against the Houthi movement and its ally, former President Saleh, in Taiz—issued a statement calling for Yemenis to reclaim their state. This was seen as a hint toward replicating the Syrian opposition’s model to confront the Houthis.
In Taiz, a city besieged by the Houthis and scarred by years of conflict, dozens took to the streets to celebrate Syria’s developments. Protesters raised banners declaring that Sana’a, under Houthi control, should be the next city to be liberated from what they described as Iranian influence.
Similar celebrations were observed in Al-Hudaydah, in areas controlled by the Yemeni government. In Al-Khokha, under the command of Presidential Leadership Council member Tariq Saleh, symbolic festivities coincided with the anniversary of the city’s liberation from the Houthis.
Houthis Silent
The Houthis have remained conspicuously silent regarding developments in Syria. Historically, the group has openly supported Assad, framing the Syrian conflict as a conspiracy by Türkiye and other states against the so-called "Axis of Resistance," a coalition led by Iran, of which the Houthis are a key component.
Notably, the Houthis launched drone strikes toward Israel just one day after the fall of Assad’s. This could be interpreted as a calculated message that these events do not concern them and that they remain capable of exerting influence.
Their silence was most evident in Sana’a, where the response was limited to condemning Israeli advances near Syria’s Quneitra border the day after the fall of Assad’s regime. Historically, the Houthis had maintained ties with Assad’s regime; Damascus was the only Arab capital to accept a Houthi ambassador, who represented their interests until this arrangement ended.
Recent reports by Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper revealed that Houthi embassy staff in Damascus departed late last year at the request of the Syrian regime, which was reportedly under Saudi-Emirati pressure.
The Southern Transitional Council’s Reserved Stance
The Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed entity that participates in Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council and advocates for southern secession, has remained silent regarding the developments in Syria. This silence likely stems from the council's alignment with the UAE, which had publicly expressed support for Assad just days before his fall. Consequently, the STC appeared to adopt a cautious stance, refraining from commenting on the events in Syria.
Summary of the Situation
The developments in Syria have deepened divisions among Yemeni factions. However, they have also sparked a broader interest in drawing lessons from the Syrian experience, both at the governmental and public levels. The exception remains the Houthi movement, which appears acutely aware of how these events could impact its survival and agenda. This awareness likely explains its silence and could potentially prompt actions that influence the trajectory of the ongoing conflict. Recent international attention on the country has grown, largely due to escalating Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea regions, as well as their strikes targeting Israel.
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